

25X1A

pp 63 & pp 68-81+ watchlisted
for JFK assassination

CONFIDENTIAL

*Firearm
Index*

9 FEB 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Control of Firearms

REFERENCE : Memo dtd 30 Jan 70 to DD/P, DD/S and OGC
for Executive Director-Comptroller, same subject

1. Pursuant to Recommendation No. 2 of referent memorandum,
it is requested that the substance of **HN 60-13** be incorporated into the
Agency regulatory system.

25X1A

2. Copies of **HN 60-13** are attached for information.

25X1A

John S. Warner
Deputy General Counsel

Att.

HN 60-13

cc: IG w/att

Distribution:

O & 1 - Adse w/att

✓ ① - OGC Official FIREARMS

1 - OGC Chrono

1 - AGC/OL Chrono/**OPagan:mab** (5 February 1970)1 - **SOD Mr. Woodward**

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Per your request for a statement of action taken on Recommendation No. 2 of IG Report on Control of Firearms, enclosed are memoranda to D/S and Executive Director-Comptroller for your signature. Attached report is returned for your files.

*This was discussed
in detail with Rep
Control - OIP*

[REDACTED]
5 February 70

DATE

25X1A

BT

OHC 70-0179

SECRET

Ogc Subj: FIREARMS

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
70-119/2

30 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Support
General Counsel

SUBJECT : Control of Firearms

1. Attached is a copy of a report on the adequacy of the Agency's regulations on the control of firearms, which was prepared by the Inspector General. You will note that the report consists of a summary, in which all of the Inspector General's recommendations appear, plus a detailed report of findings.

2. May I have from each of you, within 30 days, a statement of the actions you have taken or intend to take in response to each of the recommendations that are addressed to you for action.



L. K. White
Executive Director-Comptroller

25X1A

Attachment:
IG Report: Control of Firearms

SECRET

B3

AGENCY REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO CONTROL OF FIREARMS

The Nature and Extent of Agency Involvement with Firearms

Ordnance is big business in CIA and has been so for nearly two decades. The Agency's current involvement with firearms falls into distinct categories. The first is the supply of large quantities of ordnance materials to combat forces in Southeast Asia; the second embraces all of the other miscellaneous activities in which firearms play a part. The quantity of weapons committed to this second category of miscellaneous activities is minuscule in comparison with those supplied for war zone operations.

The great bulk of the ordnance materials required for support of current operations is acquired overtly by the Office of Logistics through requisitions levied on the Military. Covert firearms procurement, which in dollar value approximates 100 percent of our percent of the total volume, is handled through [redacted] Office of Logistics [redacted]

25X1A
25X1A

There are a variety of programs within the Agency having to do with firearms in which weapons may be procured through other than Office of Logistics channels. We have identified the following: TSD's research and development program, SOD's weapons modification program, the weapons program of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, SOD's foreign weapons procurement program, Project ~~ARMONORCH~~ (proprietary for the training of police officers), DCS' foreign materials program, and a DO Division proprietary for the purchasing of foreign materials. We found all of these activities to be under adequate control.

SECRET

24

S E C R E T

Shipment of Ordnance Materials

The vast bulk of our firearms deliveries are moved as military shipments under applicable DOD regulations. Requests for shipments of any sort that require handling in any manner other than as prescribed by law or regulation must be sent through the Office of Logistics to the Office of Security for approval.

Our own regulations and those of the Department of State forbid the possession of certain prohibited items, which include arms and ammunition. Although the regulations state that the limitation may not be waived, it is, in fact, waived on occasion.

25X1A

Storage and Handling of Ordnance Materials

Explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material are stored and handled in accordance with appropriate State and local laws and military and civil regulations. **AR 16-2** prescribes controls on the possession and handling of firearms at field stations. The only bulk storage point for ordnance materials in the U.S. is

25X1A

at Logistics Midwest Depot. There is a small stock of arms and ammunition at the Franconia Central Depot to meet priority headquarters needs. SOD and SAVA ordnance officers have a small supply of arms at the Franconia depot, which are outside of the normal stock control system.

We have discussed with the SOD officer the desirability of furnishing the depot ordnance specialist with a list of these weapons. We will take the matter up with the SAVA officer when he returns to duty from an extended illness.

Agency Regulatory Issuances

We have a fair volume of quite detailed regulatory material on the control of firearms in our manuals. The regulations derive in large part from internal Agency policy, rather than having their bases in Federal statutes. The detailed regulations concentrate primarily on the relatively small volume of weapons committed to various miscellaneous activities involving firearms outside the areas of combat operations. The guidance appears under five separate subject categories in regulations, instructions, notices, and book dispatches. Some of it relates specifically to firearms; some of it applies to firearms only as one of many types of property.

- 2 -

S E C R E T

B5

S E C R E T

Shipment of Ordnance Materials

The vast bulk of our firearms deliveries are moved as military shipments under applicable DOD regulations. Requests for shipments of any sort that require handling in any manner other than as prescribed by law or regulation must be sent through the Office of Logistics to the Office of Security for approval.

Our own regulations and those of the Department of State forbid the purchase of certain prohibited items, which include arms and ammunition. Although the regulations state that the limitation may not be waived, it is, in fact, waived on occasion.

25X1A

Storage and Handling of Ordnance Materials

Explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material are stored and handled in accordance with appropriate State and local laws and military and civil regulations. **LR 90-22** prescribes controls on the possession and handling of firearms at field stations. The only bulk storage point for ordnance materials in the U.S. is

25X1A

at Logistics Midwest Depot. There is a small stock of arms and ammunition at the Franconia Central Depot to meet priority head-quarters needs. SOD and SAVA ordnance officers have a small supply of arms at the Franconia depot, which are outside of the normal stock control system.

We have discussed with the SOD officer the desirability of furnishing the depot ordnance specialist with a list of these weapons. We will take the matter up with the SAVA officer when he returns to duty from an extended illness.

Agency Regulatory Issuances

We have a fair volume of quite detailed regulatory material on the control of firearms in our manuals. The regulations derive in large part from internal Agency policy, rather than having their bases in Federal statutes. The detailed regulations concentrate primarily on the relatively small volume of weapons committed to various miscellaneous activities involving firearms outside the areas of combat operations. The guidance appears under five separate subject categories in regulations, instructions, notices, and book dispatches. Some of it relates specifically to firearms; some of it applies to firearms only as one of many types of property.

- 2 -

S E C R E T

B5

S E C R E T

The fragmentation of the guidance may be unavoidable, but it does not make for ease of reference.

Are the Regulations Complete, Appropriate, and Consistent?

Completeness

We find only one possibly significant gap in existing regulations. It has to do with the treatment of the updating of weapons inventories at field installations. We have a question as to the form in which this inventory should be submitted and as to who should be the ultimate recipient of it.

Recommendation No. 1

That the Deputy Director for Plans, in such consultation with the Deputy Director for Support as may be appropriate, review the requirements and the mechanisms for reporting of weapons inventories of field installations and propose such revisions of **PR 10-27** as may be needed to eliminate existing ambiguities.

In July 1968, the DD/P addressed a memorandum to the Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs **and Book Dispatch No. 6622 to field stations** stating that weapons would not be made available to foreigners as gifts or as accommodation purchases without his personal approval. Since this is a standing instruction, we thought it appropriate that it be taken up into the permanent regulations. **A CBI is now in preparation.**

The General Counsel was instrumental in having **HN 60-15** issued in January 1967. The notice specified that the Office of the General Counsel was responsible for the control of all liaison with the Office of Munitions Control. The notice expired 1 January 1968. Since this also is an instruction of continuing effect, we believe that it would be appropriate to incorporate it into Agency regulations.

Recommendation No. 2

That the General Counsel propose to the Deputy Director for Support the publication in the Headquarters Regulations of the substance of **HN 60-15**

- 3 -

S E C R E T

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

p6

S E C R E T**Appropriateness**

In our inquiries into the appropriateness of the regulations on control of firearms, we repeatedly encountered officers in both the Support and the Plans Directorates who feel quite strongly that there should be one central point of control, or at least of cognizance, of the Agency's dealings in firearms. There is no such central point now, although it seems to us that the import of the regulations is that a centralized control of firearms within the Clandestine Service was envisioned. We are not sure that a point of central cognizance is needed, but we do believe that the desirability of it should be taken under consideration.

Recommendation No. 3

That the Deputy Director for Plans have a review made of the desirability and practicality of establishing a central point of cognizance of all firearms holdings and transactions within the Directorate for Plans.

Our pouch regulations state that the prohibition on the pouching of arms and ammunition may not be waived. The prohibition is waived in fact. Any pouch shipment from headquarters must be approved by the DD/P, but it is possible to pouch firearms in headquarters or laterally between stations without having first obtained DD/P approval. We doubt that it would be appropriate to put anything in writing into our regulations on the waiver process, but we do believe that some form of instruction should be issued.

25X1A

Recommendation No. 4

That the Deputy Director for Plans, by whatever means he considers appropriate, extend to inbound and lateral pouches a degree of control over the pouching of firearms equivalent to the control that exists over outbound pouches.

The regulations on the procurement, shipping, storage, and handling of firearms, with very minor exceptions, address themselves to the broad subject of government property in general. Firearms

B7

S E C R E T

are looked upon as merely as one of many categories of property. We do not see this as a significant deficiency. The supply procedures established for the control of all non-expendable Agency property seem to us adequate in the case of firearms.

Consistency

We find no major contradictions among the provisions of the several regulations having to do with the control of firearms. There are, however, a number of instances in which the guidance, if not actually contradictory, at least gives rise to uncertainties in the minds of some of those who must deal with firearms. There are enough of these seeming contradictions to call for a review of the regulations on control of firearms for consistency within and among the regulations.

Recommendation No. 5

That the Deputy Director for Support, in consultation with the Deputy Director for Plans, initiate a review of existing Agency regulations, to include Clandestine Service Instructions, with a view toward identifying and eliminating possible areas of conflict among the various Regulations and Instructions.

What Are the Checks on Compliance with the Regulations?

The periodic and continuing checks consist of audits by the Audit Staff, security surveys by the Office of Security **R/O checks on the punching of firearms** Logistics checks on questionable requisitions, and the mechanisms for the reporting of general property and financial accountability. We consider the checks to be effective. One additional check occurs to us, which is readily available but is not now applied. There is not now a requirement on the Cable Secretary for the dissemination to the DD/P of cables dealing with the control of firearms. We believe that it would be appropriate for the DD/P to receive copies of cables on this subject in view of the extent to which he has reserved to himself authorities in this field.

88

25X1A

25X1A

S E C R E T**Recommendation No. 6**

That the Deputy Director for Plans review his requirements on the Cable Secretary for dissemination of cables and consider adding to them a requirement for the dissemination to his office of all cables dealing with control of firearms.

Are the Regulations Known, Understood, and Followed?

We find that personnel who deal with firearms are aware of the applicable regulations and have a moderately good understanding of them. The degree of compliance with the regulations is not easy to assess, but we have the impression that it is high. The regulations are followed well while the firearms are in or moving through established supply channels; however, regulatory controls are not always applicable in an operational environment. When we are faced in the Agency with an operational exigency, we have no choice but to do the best we can with the means available to us. It is not a case of regulations-be-damned but of recognizing that the regulations are not absolutely binding at all times and in all situations.

Can the Regulations Be Circumvented Without Risk of Detection?

Our inclination is to give a flat "no" to this question, but there is a possibility--although a very slight one--that a dishonest employee could acquire a small quantity of weapons for unauthorized use without too much risk of his being associated with them. The examples we cite in our detailed report are quite far-fetched, and they assume a lack of integrity on the part of an employee. The consensus is that, while it would be impossible to write a regulation that would prevent a dishonest employee from engaging in an illegal firearms transaction, our existing regulations are such that he would almost surely be caught.

Are There Past or Present Firearms Transactions That May Embarrass Us In The Future?

Any individual weapon that is traceable to CIA is a potential source of future embarrassment, because we have almost no control over what happens to it after it leaves our hands. The potential for

S E C R E T

embarrassment over a single traceable weapon that goes astray is not high: usually the fact of its having gone astray becomes known when it is seized by U.S. law enforcement authorities. A tracing of its ownership history leads to CIA, and our records will reveal the disposition made of it by the Agency.

There are, however, some old large-volume firearms transactions, which might one day be the source of quantities of weapons traceable to CIA appearing on the illegal market. The

no-called "black" approach to Cuban operations (control over operations) is one of these potential sources.

We have dissociated ourselves from Sam Cummings and his associates, but we cannot be sure that all of the vestiges of the prior relationship are laid to rest. In fact, experience to date indicates that we are likely to be plagued by them for years to come.

Fallacious Allegations of CIA Involvement in Illegal Arms Deals

We examined a number of instances in which CIA has been falsely accused of affiliation with an illegal arms transaction. We have on occasion provided certifications that an individual had no connection with CIA, but in mass trials of people some of who may have had prior CIA affiliation we prefer not to do this. We are likely always to be plagued by incidents like the Redlich affair, and there often is little we can do other than be unhappy over the allegations.

How Important Are the Regulations?

Of course the regulations are important--indispensable, in fact--and it would be foolish of us to suggest otherwise. We ask the question as a means of focusing attention on a form of control that operates perhaps even more effectively than do the controls that are spelled out in the regulations. We are referring to something that might be called state of mind, or attitude, or atmosphere. We found a universal awareness that firearms, while treated as just another item of supply in the general supply regulations, are in reality a very special kind of property requiring special types of handling. It is widely believed that the upper echelons of the Agency would prefer to have no traffic at all with firearms and are likely

S E C R E T

to deal peremptorily with offenders who knowingly try to circumvent controls. This is not to say that people are running scared; it is just that they know what the general policy is, and they respect it.

What is perhaps most notable is the extent to which current attitudes with respect to firearms differ from attitudes that were prevalent in the Agency during its earlier years. Today's outlook on weapons procurement in the Office of Logistics is characterized by caution and conservatism. Within the Clandestine Service, there are variations in outlooks on firearms arising largely from differing conditions in the foreign field. Even allowing for these variations in attitudes, we think it fair to say that the Clandestine Service, too, is living in a new era in which it is understood that firearms will play a small and closely monitored role.

- 8 -

S E C R E T


211

SECRET

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT
ON
AGENCY REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO CONTROL OF FIREARMS

SECRET

B13



S E C R E T

Table of Contents	Page
ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE REVIEW	1
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH FIREARMS. . .	3
Procurement of Ordnance Material	4
Shipment of Ordnance Material	9
Storage and Handling of Ordnance Material	12
AGENCY REGULATORY ISSUANCES	16
ARE THE REGULATIONS COMPLETE, APPROPRIATE, AND CONSISTENT . .	22
Completeness	23
Appropriateness	27
Consistency	31
WHAT ARE THE CHECKS ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS . . .	35
ARE THE REGULATIONS KNOWN, UNDERSTOOD, AND FOLLOWED	37
CAN THE REGULATIONS BE CIRCUMVENTED WITHOUT RISK OF DETECTION	41
ARE THERE PAST OR PRESENT FIREARMS TRANSACTIONS THAT MAY EMBARRASS US IN THE FUTURE	44
FALLACIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGAL ARMS DEALS	49
HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE REGULATIONS	51

S E C R E T

B17

S E C R E T

ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

1. This inquiry into the adequacy of Agency regulations on the control of firearms originated as an action item from the Director's morning meeting of 14 October 1969. The Deputy Director for Support noted the item by Martin Waldron in that day's New York Times, "Arms Linked to 'Agency,'" and commented that, had we been involved as alleged, we would have known it. (The Waldron article reported the seizure last June of a five-ton cache of arms on the farm of Earl V. Redick, a firearms dealer in Fayetteville, North Carolina. Redick claimed that the arms were owned by a Henry Vizamar, who reportedly was acting on behalf of an unnamed "Federal Agency," and that they were destined for the Republic of Chad.) To assure himself that we would indeed have known it, if we had been involved in this transaction, the Director instructed the Inspector General to examine and report on all Agency regulations pertaining to the shipment and requisitioning of firearms.

2. We made a quite thorough investigation of all aspects of the Agency's involvement with firearms. This included identification and detailed study of the regulations themselves, examination of many files, and a large number of interviews of employees whose work might

S E C R E T

B15

S E C R E T

be expected to require them to be familiar with and to abide by our regulations on the control of firearms. These are the questions to which we sought answers:

What is the nature and extent of the Agency's involvement with firearms?

Which of our regulations pertain to control of firearms?

Are the regulations complete, appropriate, and consistent?

Are the regulations known, understood, and followed?

What are the checks on compliance with the regulations?

Can the regulations be circumvented without detection?

Are there past or present firearms transactions that may embarrass us in the future?

How important are the regulations in themselves?

We take up each of these questions in succeeding sections. In one section we have a brief discussion of fallacious allegations of CIA involvement in various illegal arms deals. These false accusations sometimes have an air of credibility about them, and trying to disprove them might risk more than it would be worth. There is an annex attached to the report as Tab B examining one of these fallacious allegations in detail. It describes two incidents in the New Orleans area, which District Attorney James Garrison tried to link to CIA and to the assassination of President Kennedy.

S E C R E T

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF AGENCY INVOLVEMENT WITH FIREARMS

[REDACTED]

25X1A

2. The Agency's current involvement with firearms falls into two distinct categories. The first is the supply of large quantities of ordnance materials to combat forces and paramilitary activities in the Southeast Asia war zone; the second embraces all of the other miscellaneous activities in which firearms play a part. Included in the second category are: paramilitary operations elsewhere in the world

[REDACTED] that are supported by CIA; gifts [REDACTED] of weapons for liaison services and other operational contacts; research, development, and testing of special-purpose weapons; training activities; [REDACTED] operations involving the stocking of foreign weapons for later export; official weapons held by installations for protection of classified material or of personnel or for operational use; and personally owned weapons. The quantity of weapons committed to this second category of

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

B17

S E C R E T

miscellaneous activities is minuscule in comparison with those supplied for war zone operations.

Procurement of Ordnance Material

Overt

3. The great bulk of the ordnance material required by the Agency in support of current operations is procured by the Office of Logistics in response to requisitions received from user components. Almost all of it is acquired by Logistics by requisition on the military and is for use in Southeast Asia.

Covert

All covert firearm procurement is handled through a Maryland proprietary in Baltimore known as Associated Traders Corporation. Associated Traders buys only from the following licensed firearms dealers:

1042/ Winchester's Ltd.
Winchester, Virginia

1042/ McCarty's Gun Shop, Inc.
1042 Metropolitan Avenue
Baltimore, Maryland

1042/ Arthur's Gun Supply Corporation
122 Ambrette Avenue
Laurel, Maryland

25X1A

For the three-month period immediately preceding our investigation, covert firearms procurements consisted of 17 transactions with a total dollar value of \$4,639. That sum is 15/100s of one percent of the

25X1A

B18

SECRET

average total expenditures for ordnance per quarter last year. It should be noted that [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]

TSD's Research and Development Program

5. TSD is responsible, in coordination with SOD, for the conduct of research and development of paramilitary material. This frequently involves the purchase of a firearm or firearms by a TSD contractor from a commercial gun manufacturing firm. After modification (in which the gun may lose its identity) it or they are delivered to TSD by the contractor. When the weapon(s) is delivered to the component levying the requirement, it is taken up into Agency inventory.

25X1A

SOD's Research and Development Program

6. SOD is engaged, in coordination with TSD and the Vietnamese Affairs Staff, in a program of testing opposition weapons and of modifying U.S. weapons to improve their effectiveness. In the process, it acquires weapons from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. There is a very small fraternity of officers engaged in the development and testing of special weapons and ammunition. There apparently is a certain amount of swapping of weapons among them; however, the SOD Technical Requirements Officer is confident that he knows the whereabouts of all weapons for which he is accountable.

- 5 -

SECRET

B19

25X1A

S E C R E T

The Weapons Programs of the Vietnamese Affairs Staff

7. The Vietnamese Affairs Staff has engaged from time to time with T&A and SOD in programs designed to improve the capabilities of weapons available to our assets in Southeast Asia. The staff has a firearms specialist assigned to it, and he has a small supply of weapons sent to him from Southeast Asia. At the moment, the Staff is concentrating on carbine ammunition enhancement in an effort to improve the fire power of the large numbers of carbines already in the hands of our Asian allies.

SOD's Foreign Weapons Procurement Program

8. SOD maintains at Midwest Depot for contingency use a store of weapons in what is known as the JUMEDRICK pack. These are non-attributable weapons, many of which are of foreign manufacture. At one time, there were JUMEDRICK packs stored at various overseas installations, but they have now all been consolidated at Midwest. There are occasional requirements for foreign-made weapons, which are "borrowed" from the JUMEDRICK pack with SOD's approval. SOD then must procure replacements. Usually the needed replacements can be procured from liaison services abroad with SOD working through our local stations. Ghana, for example, is a current source of Soviet-made weapons. At the time of interviews in SOD, they were awaiting a shipment from Vietnam. SOD's role in this is limited to levying the requirement on a field station, supplying the money for the purchase, and furnishing a shipping address (always the Midwest Depot).

S E C R E T

B20

25X1A

S E C R E T

Project ENDKORFH

9. Project ENDKORFH was established in 1952 to provide training and modern police equipment to police agencies throughout the world. It has an overt contract with AID for the training of some 500-600 police officers each year. It also is an authorized representative of manufacturers of equipment used by police forces. It has a modest display of weapons at its academy, most of which are police service revolvers. The project operates essentially as a broker in firearms procurements. Many of the police officers it trains want to buy personal weapons to take back with them. ENDKORFH suggests an appropriate type of weapon and tells the officer how to go about buying it legally. This requires a letter from the officer's parent Embassy authorizing the purchase and the importing of the weapon and purchase permits from the appropriate District of Columbia authorities. Occasionally, ENDKORFH acts as the middleman in the bulk purchase of firearms for a foreign police or security service. If the official or the organization is sponsored by AID, no DD/P approval is required for ENDKORFH participation. However, if the request is made through CIA channels, then the DD/P's approval must be obtained for an accommodation purchase on behalf of foreigners.

DCS' Foreign Materials Program

10. The Format Staff of the Domestic Contact Service's Soviet Bloc Division functions essentially as a clearing house for the intelligence and defense communities in the procurement of foreign-made materiel for

- 7 -

S E C R E T

B21

25X1A

S E C R E T

intelligence exploitation or for operational purposes. It has disbursed some \$3 million (largely DoD funds) during the last three years or so and has a \$4 million "line of credit" with Defense's DD/R&D for a single acquisition project. The larger chunks of the money have gone for costly items such as aircraft and advanced weapons systems; however, Format Staff also has participated in the acquisition of infantry and other combat-type weapons for a variety of purposes. Its combat procurements are largely from a limited number of established and reputable sources, although it also exploits sources of opportunity (the residue of the Six-Day War, for example). It also is occasionally the recipient of surplus weapons from the Department of Defense for possible Agency use. Its principal Agency customer is SO Division. Format Staff acquires the weapons and has them put into the Logistics warehouse system. SO Division takes over from there.

DO Division's Procurement Activities

11. DO Division operates a commercial enterprise, an Agency proprietary project, for the procurement of foreign materials abroad. These are materials that may become available for commercial sale but which are not ordinarily offered for sale directly to governments or which the U.S. Government prefers not to purchase in its own name. The materials may consist of almost anything that the U.S. Government wishes to purchase covertly; however, the principal customer is the Department of Defense for items with military applications, and its interest lies in the intelligence exploitation of the items.

- 8 -

S E C R E T

B22

S E C R E T

Shipment of Ordnance Materials

25X1A 12. The Agency regulation on shipment of government property [REDACTED] specifies that the shipment of explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material shall be made in accordance with appropriate Federal and State laws and military and civil regulations. All shipments are to be made under the supervision of a qualified ammunition inspector. Requests for shipments of any sort that require handling in any manner other than as prescribed by law or regulation must be sent through the Office of Logistics to the Office of Security for approval.

13. The vast bulk of our firearms deliveries are moved as military shipments under applicable DOD regulations. [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED] The Office of Logistics has issued special instructions on the packaging and marking of pilferable cargoes, such as handguns.


Pouching of Firearms

14. Department of State regulations forbid the shipping by pouch of such things as perishables, liquids, explosives, firearms, ammunition, and nitrate film. The prohibition stems from concern for the safety of passengers on an aircraft and for the diplomatic implications attendant upon discovery of violations of pouch agreements. An identical prohibition appears in our own regulations. The applicable Clandestine Service Instruction states that limitations on size and

S E C R E T

weight of pouches items may be waived but that the limitation on the
pouching of prohibited items will not be waived.

25X1A



- 10 -

S E C R E T

824

25X1A

S E C R E T

- There have been a total of 69 shipments since June 1958.
- Forty-two of the shipments consisted of a single weapon.
- We found only three instances of ammunition being pouched.
- Weapons must be disassembled, with the parts being shipped in separate pouches. Often, the waiver approval specified that this be done.
- The shipments have been distributed as follows: 39 to AF, 13 to NE, seven to WH, five to WE, three to FE, and two on behalf of SB.
- The great bulk of the weapons were destined as gifts to high government officials, senior liaison contacts, or to persons being developed as operational contacts.
- There are four instances of weapons being shipped for use in the personal protection of station personnel.
- Fifty-one of the shipments consisted of hand guns. There was one shotgun. The rest were rifles, carbines, and submachine guns.
- The largest shipment consisted of 30 revolvers for the arming of the presidential guard in a South American country. We had trained the members of the guard.

The pouching of firearms from headquarters is under tight control. Good records are kept in RID. We interviewed one Logistics Officer who commented that he would like to see some relaxation of pouch controls, because the pouch is the safest and fastest way of making assured delivery to the intended recipient.

- 11 -

S E C R E T

305

S E C R E T

Storage and Handling of Ordnance Materials

17. The applicable headquarters regulation [REDACTED] specifies that explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material shall be stored and handled under the supervision of a qualified ammunition inspector and in accordance with Army Ordnance Corps Manual 7-224 and appropriate State and local laws and regulations. The regulation also specifies that storage facilities for explosives, ammunition, and other dangerous material shall be inspected periodically by a Safety Officer, designated by the Director of Security, who is qualified in ordnance storage and handling.

25X1A

25X1A

18. [REDACTED] prescribes the policies and procedures to be followed by field installations in the issuance and control of firearms, except for special devices and for firearms issued for approved paramilitary projects. The regulation requires that the Chief of Station establish procedures, in writing, for the control and issuance of firearms charged to the station. The Chief of Station may delegate to a senior officer at the station, or to a Chief of Base, the authority for the safekeeping and issuance of firearms in accordance with rules approved by the Chief of Station. The regulation requires that the Chief of Station forward a copy of the station's procedures to headquarters, along with an inventory of weapons on hand. The inventory is to be revised as changes occur.

- 12 -

S E C R E T

B20

25X1A

S E C R E T

Midwest Depot

19. Ordnance materials are stored in quantity in the United States only at the Midwest Depot near San Antonio, Texas. The inspector making this investigation did not visit the Depot, because a team of inspectors examined the facility recently in connection with our survey of the Office of Logistics. They were favorably impressed with the professionalism displayed in the operation of the Depot. They report that ordnance materials appeared to be properly stored and handled and that good controls are maintained over them. As noted previously, SQD's pack of ordnance materials for contingency support of paramilitary operations is maintained at the Midwest Depot.

Central Depot


20. The Office of Logistics keeps a small store of arms and ammunition in the Central Depot at near Franconia, Virginia, for quick response to priority headquarters requirements for individual weapons. The ordnance shop is a compartmented area within the warehouse under the control of an ordnance specialist. Access to it is severely limited and tightly controlled. Firearms are stored within the ordnance shop in an additionally compartmented and secure locker room. Satisfactory controls are maintained on weapons that are being packaged for shipment from the Depot.

21. As of early December, the weapons inventory at the Central Depot ordnance shop consisted of 327 U.S. and foreign made rifles, handguns, machine guns, submachine guns, and shotguns. Ammunition on

B-1

S E C R E T

25X1A



22. Although an Office of Logistics facility, the Central Depot ordnance shop is used by SOD and SAVA officers in connection with their programs for testing foreign weapons and improving U.S. weapons and ammunition. SOD's Technical Requirements Officer and SAVA's ordnance specialist both make some use of the shop's facilities for working on weapons, and both have small quantities of weapons stored in the arms locker and in locked cabinets designated for their use. At the time of our visit to the shop, there were two large crates of miscellaneous foreign-made weapons--evidently collected in Southeast Asia--stored in the arms locker. They did not belong to the SOD officer. We could not confirm the source of these weapons nor the use planned for them, because the SAVA ordnance specialist was hospitalized and not available for interview. These weapons that are collected and stored for use in the R&D programs are handled outside of the normal stock control system; however, our inquiries suggest that they

- 14 -

S E C R E T

L28

S E C R E T

are handled with as much care as the requirements for flexibility in the programs will permit.

23. The Depot ordnance specialist is generally aware of the nature and of the approximate quantities of weapons being stored in his shop by SOD and SAVA, but he does not know precisely what may be on hand at a given time. We see no need for a stock control system between him and SOD and SAVA, but we do believe that he should be furnished lists--kept up to date--of ordnance materials stored with him. The SOD Technical Requirements Officer assured us that he would prepare such a list at his earliest opportunity. We will take this up with the SAVA ordnance specialist when he returns to duty.

S E C R E T

AGENCY REGULATORY ISSUANCES

1. The previous section, professedly describing the nature and extent of the Agency's involvement with firearms, dwelt heavily on the regulatory aspect. We found this unavoidable. We do many things in this Agency that are not "according to the book," primarily because they are not the sort of things that are susceptible to control by regulations. This is not so with respect to firearms in non-war zone areas. We have a fair volume of quite detailed regulatory material on the control of firearms in our manuals, and one cannot speak of the Agency's involvement with firearms without reference to the regulations that apply to that involvement.

2. A unique feature of Agency regulations on the control of firearms is that they derive in large part from internal Agency policy, rather than having their bases in Federal statutes. Of course, the regulations were written with an eye to ensuring that Agency practices are in conformance with applicable laws and external regulations. However, we could identify only one regulatory issuance currently on the books that was put there in direct response to a Federal law. We refer to ~~Book Dispatch No. 644~~, which was sent out in April of this year, giving guidance on the importing of personally owned firearms. The stimulus for ~~the Book Dispatch~~ came from the Gun Control Act of

25X1A

25X1A

22

S E C R E T

1963. A draft revision of applicable regulations, taking up the provisions of the Book Dispatch into the standing regulations, is now out for coordination.

3. Another noteworthy feature of Agency regulations on the control of firearms is that the detailed regulations concentrate primarily on the relatively small volume of weapons committed to various miscellaneous activities involving firearms--and most especially on official weapons and those that are personally owned. Those provisions of general supply regulations that are applicable to the bulk procurement, shipment, and issuance of weapons to war zone operations state, in substance, that the transactions will be made in accordance with pertinent Federal and State laws and military and civil regulations.

4. The present strict controls on official and personally owned firearms--and they are strict--came about as a result of a concern expressed by General Carter in 1963. He wrote in an Action Memorandum to the Director of Security and the Deputy Director for Support, dated 31 January 1963:

"I am appalled at the number of people in the Agency authorized to carry firearms. I had received information previously from an external source that the city fathers of the District of Columbia were about to raise this issue. This was what prompted my request for information as to Agency activities in this regard.

"... As I understand the law, we are authorized to designate certain couriers and guards to carry firearms 'when engaged in transportation of confidential documents and materials.' To me this means exactly that--and I cannot see how we would have as many as 250 people running around carrying confidential documents all at the same time.

- 17 -

S E C R E T

13

S E C R E T

25X1A because the [REDACTED] in the Headquarters Regulations makes no
specific reference to firearms as a supply item. The [REDACTED] are last
indexed in 1956. The one index lead to "firearms" and the one to
25X1A "weapons" refer to [REDACTED] that are no longer on the books. The exist-
25X1A ing [REDACTED] references to firearms appeared in the manual after the date
of the last indexing. To make reasonably certain that we had found
all references to firearms, we resorted to a page-by-page review of
every regulatory issuance which, from its title, might conceivably
have something to say about firearms. We believe we found them all,
but we cannot state this as a certainty. A list appears at Tab A. We
can illustrate some of the difficulties that may be encountered in
working with the regulations by these examples:

a. Early in this investigation in a meeting with logistics
officers, after we had read all of the pertinent regulations we
could find, we asked if there was a requirement that the serial
numbers of rifles be recorded at any point in the supply chain.
No one knew. The next day one of the logistics officers called
and directed our attention to a provision of [REDACTED] specifying
25X1A that sensitive and expensive items bearing serial numbers shall
be accounted for and identified by serial numbers from time of
issue to user through final disposition or turn-in, except when
otherwise authorized by headquarters. We had read that regulation
but had no recollection of having seen that particular sub-sub-
paragraph in which weapons are cited as a "for example."

S E C R E T

b. We discovered one additional reference to firearms in the regulations on 3 December when we were already some seven weeks into this inquiry and were assembling our materials in preparation for the writing of our report.

c. On 5 December, an Operating Division Logistics Officer, who knew that we were digging into the subject of control of firearms, called the inspector and asked which, if any, of the regulations applied to a request from the field for the purchase and shipment to the station of a shotgun for recreational use. He may only have been concerned over the possible embarrassment to his division from making a mistake while an Inspector General investigation was under way, but he seemed to us to be honestly perplexed as to whether a request such as this is covered by one of the regulations. (It is.)

7. Despite the difficulties we encountered in assembling all pertinent regulatory material on the control of firearms, and in organizing it for study, we doubt that it would be appropriate to pull together all references to firearms under a single, blanket regulation. Ordnance materials are not, in our judgment, so exceptional items of supply as to require wholly segregate treatment in the regulations. We do believe, however, that ease of use would be enhanced if certain provisions of headquarters issuances were combined under a single heading. Furthermore, guidance on control of firearms is fragmented;

S E C R E T

some of it is seemingly contradictory; and there is at least one significant gap in it. We have a more detailed discussion of these problems in the following section.

S E C R E T

ARE THE REGULATIONS COMPLETE, APPROPRIATE, AND CONSISTENT?

1. As a general observation, we have the impression that the regulations were drafted with care and with specific goals in mind. We also have the impression that the body of regulations on firearms was constituted in piecemeal fashion, with individual regulations appearing in response to separate stimuli. If there has been any attempt to sit down and study the whole body of firearms regulations for completeness, appropriateness, and consistency, we did not learn of it. General Carter's concern in 1963 did stimulate a thorough review of firearms holdings and led to the publication of [REDACTED] "Control of Firearms." We doubt, however, that that review included a full examination of regulations already on the books.

2. Because the guidance on control of firearms is dispersed among several regulations in five separate subject categories, there is always a risk of having left something out or of writing something into one regulation that is not wholly consistent with something appearing in some other regulation. If there is a seeming conflict between guidance in one issuance and guidance in another, then a question arises as to which directive takes precedence over the other. We find evidence of both incompleteness and inconsistency in our regulations on firearms, although not of major proportions.

S E C R E T

Completeness

3. Our discussion here of completeness concerns itself with the regulations that are already on the books. Do they contain all of the guidance needed to accomplish the purposes of the regulations? We take up the possible need for additional or different regulations in the subsequent section on "appropriateness."

4. We find only one possibly significant gap in existing regulations. It has to do with the treatment of the updating of weapons inventories at field installations. [REDACTED] "Control of Firearms," dated 15 November 1963, the Deputy Director for Plans reserves to himself the authority to approve requests from Chiefs of Station to have firearms at a station or at a subordinate base, including types and numbers of weapons. [REDACTED] "Control of Firearms," dated 20 March 1963, specifies that the Chief of Station shall forward to headquarters an inventory of weapons on hand and that the inventory shall be revised as changes occur. [REDACTED] "Administrative Reporting for Small Stations," lists as a reporting requirement upon the occurrence of the event: "Acquisition or disposal of firearms; changes in inventory; accidents involving."

5. A question arises as to the form in which this inventory should be submitted and as to who should be the ultimate recipient of it. [REDACTED] also requires that the Chief of Station submit to headquarters a copy of his written procedures for the control and issuance

B37

S E C R E T

25X1A

of firearms at his station. [REDACTED] specifies that the Chief of the Operating Division shall provide a copy of these procedures to the SSA/DDS for a central file, which the latter will maintain on behalf of the ID/P. There is no corresponding guidance on the disposition of the reports of inventory and inventory changes. (The SSA/DDS does hold a central file of the initial inventories but not of all changes.)

6. This seeming defect in the regulations came to our attention as a result of a report of audit of [REDACTED] which took note of the fact that the station had seven weapons on hand despite a DDP-approved inventory for the station of zero. On inquiring into this, we found that four of the weapons had been taken to the station by headquarters officers on TDY [REDACTED]. When the operation aborted, they left the weapons behind at the station.

25X1A

The other three weapons were pushed to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] as the result of a problem of disposing of them in [REDACTED].

25X1A

7. The Chief of Station may have had reasonable cause for believing that his weapons inventory changes were known to headquarters and were already a matter of official record. [REDACTED] is a type and station for purposes of supply and financial property accounting. The Chief of Station is the responsible officer for non-expendable property, but accountability is maintained by headquarters. The Office of Logistics maintains and forwards to the station at least annually a Consolidated Memorandum Receipt (CMR) informing the Chief of Station

25X1A

B38

S E C R E T

25X1A

of his current inventory list as recorded at headquarters. The four weapons taken [REDACTED] by the Tickers appear on a C&R of April 1969. All seven weapons appear on the C&R of August 1969. Further, there was an exchange of cables among headquarters and the stations arranging for [REDACTED]

25X1A

8. It seems to us from studying [REDACTED] that it was intended that the weapons inventory was something to be approved and reported upon separately from ordinary property accounting and reporting, although the regulation does not specifically so state. If the DD/P reserves to himself the authority to approve requests to have firearms at a station--as he does [REDACTED] then it would seem that his approval would have to be sought for any modifications of his prior approvals. The mere taking up of the weapons into the C&R does not appear to accomplish the intended purpose of the regulations. The C&R is an exercise between the Office of Logistics and the station; there is no Clandestine Service involvement in it. Further, the C&R may be out of date by as much as a year or more.

25X1A

25X1A

9. It appears to us that the problem discussed above arises from a deficiency in the regulations and that steps should be taken to correct it. We have a recommendation to this effect in our summary report.

10. In July 1968, the DD/P addressed a memorandum to Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs stating that weapons will not be made available

- 25 -

S E C R E T

B39

S E C R E T

to foreigners as gifts or as accommodation purchases made for them through Agency personnel or facilities. The prohibition extends to giving or selling to foreigners weapons personally owned by our employees. Any exception to this prohibition requires DD/P approval. The memorandum stated that regulations, instructions, and guidance material dealing with the control of firearms would be revised accordingly. The same instruction was transmitted to field stations and bases in early August 1966 [REDACTED]

25X1A

11. At the time of our inquiries, action had not yet been taken to incorporate this directive into the standing regulations. We called the matter to the attention of the CS officer responsible for reviewing documents put out as interim guidance with a view toward their possible inclusion in the permanent manuals. A [REDACTED] is now in preparation.

25X1A

12. The General Counsel was instrumental in having [REDACTED] "Liaison with the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State," issued in January 1967. When Mr. John Sipes replaced Mr. Robert Margrave as the Director of the Office of Munitions Control, he remarked to Larry Houston that he had often observed Margrave dealing on obviously confidential matters with people unknown to Sipes. For his own protection and that of the Agency, he asked that a means be established for confirming the bona fides of visitors from CIA. The General Counsel wrote to Sipes in February 1967 informing him that the

25X1A

B40

S E C R E T

Office of the General Counsel is responsible for the control of all liaison with Munitions Control. Notification of this within the Agency was accomplished by publication of [REDACTED] That notice was allowed to expire on 1 January 1968, which means that it presumably has been removed by the holders of the manuals. (We found that our own copy of the notice had been pulled from the manual and destroyed.) Since there is a continuing requirement for prior coordination with the Office of the General Counsel of any contact with the Office of Munitions Control, we believe that the substance of [REDACTED] should be taken up into the standing regulations. We so recommend in our summary report.

25X1A

25X1A

Appropriateness

13. In our inquiries into the adequacy of our regulations on control of firearms, we repeatedly encountered officers in both the Support and the Plans Directorates who feel quite strongly that there should be one central point of control, or at least of cognizance, of the Agency's dealings in firearms. Some non-C3 officers believe that, because of compartmentation, there may be things going on having to do with firearms that are unknown to the proper authorities. They point to the project system--especially those projects that operate under administrative plans--as being an area in which normal procurement controls may not apply. As we began our inquiries in the Clandestine Service, it quickly became apparent that identifying the nature and

S E C R E T

extent of CS involvement with firearms would require a check with every single component of the CS in order to speak with any confidence on the subject. We did just that. We found nothing seriously amiss, but coming up with even a negative finding was a tedious and time-consuming exercise.

14. We have mixed feelings on this point. The lack of a central point of cognizance means that any time a question is raised about the totality of our involvement with firearms an exercise similar to the one we have just completed must be gone through again. We wonder, though, how often there is going to be a requirement such as this. There was a massive review and adjustment of weapons holdings in 1967. This inquiry of ours five years later reveals that things are still pretty well in hand. With the controls that have been added in recent years, it seems unlikely that any gross irregularities will develop. On the other hand, although the regulations are not specific on this point, it seems to us that the import of them is that a centralized control of firearms was envisioned.

15. Since we found nothing much wrong with the present system, we are not prepared to recommend that a central point of control or cognizance be established. We do believe, though, that it is a matter that should be taken under consideration, and we have a recommendation to that effect in our summary report.

16. Another area in which the appropriateness of a regulation comes into question is in the limitation on the pouching of prohibited

25X1A

S E C R E T

items. Both the Agency Regulation and the Clandestine Services Instruction on this point state flatly that the limitation on pouching of prohibited items may not be waived. As we have noted in the earlier section on shipment of firearms, the limitation is, in fact, waived on occasion. For shipments being pouches from headquarters, the waiver is granted only by the DD/P. No such central control appears to exist over prohibited items that are pouches from the field to headquarters or laterally between field stations. It seems to us that, if it is important that the DD/P alone authorize shipments of contraband from headquarters, then his approval also should be procured for similar pouch shipments to headquarters and between stations. We know that such shipments have taken place, but we have no ready way of discovering their frequency--other than by going on a fishing expedition through an assortment of files. We suspect that AF Division would be the most likely source of these shipments because of the lack of secure means of shipment in that area other than by pouch.

17. What may have evolved is an awareness that the pouch is available for shipping weapons and that the statement that the limitation may not be waived is of little meaning. We have heard the argument that, since we routinely (although not by regulation) dismantle the weapons and ship the pieces in separate pouches, we are not shipping weapons--only parts. (We might note in this regard that the instructions for the two shipments that came to our attention--one laterally and one to headquarters--included an admonition that the

S E C R E T

[illegible]

18. There is one final area on which we feel we should comment; however, our views are not well enough formed for us to call into question the appropriateness of the regulation. This has to do with the ~~Logistics~~ in the regulations--Logistics. The regulations on the procurement, shipping, storage, and handling of firearms, with very minor exceptions, address themselves to the broad subject of government property in general. Firearms are looked upon as merely one of many categories of property. We treat such things as automobiles and furniture as separate entities in the regulations--but not firearms. There are specific references in the Logistics regulations to the handling of ammunition and other dangerous materials but not to weapons--again with one or two exceptions.

19. We heard arguments in favor of setting up firearms as a separate category in the regulations, with narcotics and precious metals being cited by comparison. We are not persuaded that anything significant would be gained by this. The supply procedures established for the control of all nonexpendable Agency property seem to

SECRET

B. 7

S E C R E T

us adequate in the case of firearms. Related regulations in the Security series provide appropriate additional controls.

Consistency

20. We find no major contradictions among the provisions of the several regulations having to do with the control of firearms. There are, however, a few instances in which the guidance, if not actually contradictory, at least gives rise to uncertainties in the minds of some of those who must deal with firearms. We are somewhat reluctant even to surface these as possible discrepancies, because our comments on them necessarily have an air of niggling over trivia. We are calling attention to them, however, because we did encounter some people who had doubts over definitions and delegations of authority.

21. The regulation that gives rise to most of the uncertainty is [REDACTED], "Authorization and Control of Firearms Issued for Training, Research, and Operational Purposes." The regulation is listed as having been "Revised: 1 April 1961." This signifies that it was already on the books when the regulations were converted to the new format in April 1961 and has remained unchanged since that date. The following are possible inconsistencies in the regulations:

- a. The lead sentence of [REDACTED] states that the regulation prescribes the responsibilities and procedures governing the requisition and control of firearms for operational use overseas. What constitutes "operational use" is subject to varying

S E C R E T

interpretations. In a subsequent subparagraph on procedures, the statement is made that the Chief of an Operating Division shall establish adequate control and continuing accountability of all weapons under his jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied.) Use of the word "all" without qualification seems to suggest that all weapons held by the Division are for operational use and that there are no exclusions from the responsibility of the Division Chief. ~~RR 10-31~~ distinguishes among weapons necessary for the protection of classified information or facilities, weapons for the protection of personnel and their dependents, and weapons for approved operational purposes.

25X1A

25X1A

b. ~~RR 10-31~~ states that: "...within the Clandestine Services, the Chiefs of Special Staffs and Operating Divisions shall, within their respective areas of jurisdiction, determine the need for, ensure proper use of, and establish adequate control and continuing accountability by make and serial number of all weapons under their jurisdiction." (Underscoring supplied.) This seems inconsistent with guidance in ~~RR 10-31(4)~~ which reads: "Before issue to user, no attempt shall be made to obtain serial numbers of equipment by opening or unpacking the equipment, and thus destroying the protection of the packaging or processing."

25X1A

25X1A

c. ~~RR 10-31~~ states that responsibility within the Clandestine Service for requisitioning and controlling firearms for

S E C R E T

operational use overseas rests with the Chiefs of Special Staffs and Operating Divisions. [REDACTED] states that authority is reserved to the DD/P to approve requests from Chiefs of Station to have firearms at a station or at a subordinate base, including types and numbers of weapons. The effect of the [REDACTED] is to withdraw from Chiefs of Operating Divisions some of the responsibility assigned to them in RR 10-31. This introduces a complication: the individual must remember that there is something in a [REDACTED] that modifies the [REDACTED] which is cross-referenced to the [REDACTED] but there naturally is no reverse cross-referencing.

d. Book Dispatch [REDACTED], which forbids the furnishing of firearms to foreigners without prior DD/P approval, is now being taken up into [REDACTED]. Presumably the [REDACTED] will further abridge the responsibilities assigned in [REDACTED].

e. There is a seeming inconsistency between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on the disposition of weapons. [REDACTED] states: "Chiefs of Station or Base are authorized to approve disposal of property...without headquarters approval, except for vehicles and regulated items which are neither condemned nor compromised." Firearms are regulated items. [REDACTED] states: "If firearms on hand are no longer needed, or if they are of an unsuitable type or of doubtful serviceability, the Chief of Station may dispose of them in accordance with the provisions of [REDACTED]."

B47

S E C R E T

22. Some of these examples are rather far-fetched, and others might read some of them as not being examples of inconsistencies. In our view, however, there are enough occurrences of contradictory provisions--or of provisions that may be interpreted as being contradictory--to call for a review of the regulations on control of firearms for consistency within and among the regulations. We have a recommendation to that effect in our summary report.

S E C R E T

WHAT ARE THE CHECKS ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS?

1. There are a number of checks on compliance with the regulations on the control of firearms. Some of them are in the form of periodic reviews, and some operate continuously within the procurement cycle. We have no way of evaluating the effectiveness of these checks, but we have the impression that they give reasonably good assurance that nothing could go seriously amiss and remain that way for long. These are the checks of which we are aware:

a. The Audit Staff, in its annual audits of all Agency installations, routinely checks on compliance with the provisions of PR 10-27 on the storage, control of issuance, and reporting of inventory of firearms. During the course of this investigation, we noted two current reports of audit that made recommendations on the control of firearms at the field stations.

b. The Office of Security, in its periodic security surveys of Agency installations, takes account of firearms holdings in the context of overall security protection of the installation.

c. R&D has a close check on the pouching of firearms from headquarters. We have taken note in an earlier section of the absence of similarly close checks on weapons pouches to headquarters or laterally between stations.

- 35 -

S E C R E T

B-49

S E C R E T

d. The Director of Logistics has issued a written directive to the Chiefs of the Supply and Procurement Divisions instructing them to make sure that any requisition received in the Office of Logistics requesting firearms for issuance to foreigners be accompanied by the written approval of the DD/P. Usually the requisition itself reveals something about the source of the request and the ultimate destination of the weapon. Logistics' practice is to ask when in doubt.

e. Perhaps the most effective continuing check exists in our mechanisms for the reporting of general property and financial accountability.

2. One additional check occurs to us, which is readily available and is not now applied. There is not now a requirement on the Cable Secretary for the dissemination to the DD/P of cables dealing with the control of firearms. We believe that it would be appropriate for the DD/P to receive copies of cables on this subject, especially in view of the extent to which he has reserved to himself authorities in this field. We note in this regard that the ESA/DDS, who presumably would ride herd on this for the DD/P, receives his cables through the Office of the DD/S. This may pose a small problem, but we see no reason why it could not be worked out. We have a recommendation on this point in our summary report.

E-37

S E C R E T

ARE THE REGULATIONS KNOWN, UNDERSTOOD, AND FOLLOWED?

1. We tested knowledge and understanding of the regulations by inquiries of a number of officers in Logistics, Security, and the Clandestine Service. Our conclusion is that personnel who deal with firearms are aware of the applicable regulations and have a moderately good understanding of them. As noted earlier, the fragmentation of guidance among an assortment of regulations makes them not very easy to work with. We also found some uncertainties arising from seeming inconsistencies in the regulations. In general, though, we believe that knowledge and understanding of the regulations are adequate. We might note in this connection a remark made by a young operations officer who had recently returned from a field tour. His reply to our question was substantially as follows: "No, I don't know precisely what the regulations have to say about the control of firearms, but I do know that this is a subject on which the DD/P is real goosy, and I wouldn't make a move without being sure that I was following the book to the letter."

2. The degree of compliance with the regulations is not easy to assess, but we have the impression that it is high. The Office of Logistics is meticulous in adhering to the applicable laws and regulations on the handling of firearms. Our office reviews all

S E C R E T

reports of audits, and we can recall only two in recent months that found flaws in the control of firearms at field installations. We examined the written records on a number of firearms transactions. Most of them were strictly according to the book. One transaction, which became the basis for an audit exception, resulted in increasing the weapons inventory of a field station. Presumably this would require DD/P approval, which was not obtained. Instructions have been sent to the station [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED] This also would appear to require DD/P approval, which was not obtained. We suspect that there may be other instances of noncompliance with the provisions of [REDACTED] but we have no good way of checking on this--other than by awaiting reports of audit. As we have noted earlier, there may be some misunderstanding of just what is expected under [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

3. We noted in the preceding paragraph that we believe that there is a high degree of compliance with the regulations on the control of firearms. The statement needs some qualification. The regulations are followed well while the firearms are in or moving through established supply channels; however, regulatory controls are not always applicable in an operational environment. We can cite a couple of examples concerning weapons, ammunition, and explosives of which we have personal knowledge.

B-10

25X1C

S E C R E T

a. Allegations reached the White House in 1962 of CIA misdoings in the Miami area. A team of inspectors was sent to Florida to investigate. The Chief of Station (Ted Shackley), in his general operational briefing of the team, cited as a prime security concern the fact that the Station had no choice but to haul large quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives around the State of Florida by means that were in contravention of Federal, State, and Agency regulations.

b. After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis subsided, the German Station was called upon to support sabotage operations directed against Cuban shipping calling at ports in Europe. The Station had no sabotage materials on hand, and its assigned TSD officer was an audio specialist with only familiarization training in the handling of explosives. Since the German Station had no sabotage materials in stock and the need was immediate, the TSD specialist "borrowed" devices and explosives from a military unit--ostensibly for use in a planned training program. The Station did not have facilities for storing hazardous materials nor for transporting them as specified in Agency regulations. The job was done, however, within the time allowed and by the means at hand.

253

S E C R E T

We do not describe the above activities as we do with the intent of being critical of them. What we are illustrating is the fact that, when we are faced in the Agency with an operational exigency, we often have no choice but to do the best we can with the means available to us. It is not a case of regulations-be-damned but of recognizing that the regulations are not absolutely binding at all times and in all situations.

- 40 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

CAN THE REGULATIONS BE CIRCUMVENTED WITHOUT RISK OF DETECTION?

1. We asked this question of most of the people we interviewed, including a random sampling of operations officers who have served both at headquarters and abroad. Each of them felt that it would be just about impossible for him to make off with any quantity of weapons or to acquire official funds for the private purchase of weapons from nonofficial sources. This is a question that we would prefer not to have to answer. Our inclination is to give a flat "no" and go on to the next question, but there is a possibility--although a very slight one--that a dishonest employee could acquire a small quantity of weapons for unauthorized use without too much risk of his being associated with them.

a. It is conceivable that an employee who was willing to be a thief could pilfer a few weapons ~~from the Midwest Depot~~. They would have to be concealable weapons that could be hidden in or under his clothing. However, nearly all of the employees ~~at Midwest~~ are long-time employees of demonstrated integrity.

b. It is also conceivable--but only by an extreme stretch of the imagination--that an employee could dream up a phony project by which he could obtain funds for the private purchase of firearms. Most people felt, however, that this would require the collusion of an officer at a level where collusion is out of the question.

- 41 -

S E C R E T

B55

S E C R E T

c. One operations officer suggested that it might have been possible for him to have padded his operational expenses while at his station and eventually to have accumulated enough money to buy a few weapons on the local market. He added that, because of the high cost of guns in his area, the money he could have diverted would not have bought more than one or two weapons.

d. Perhaps the most plausible suggestion came from another operations officer. He had been involved in the planning for the caching of some Chinese weapons for later exposure and subsequent sale to the Chinese. He suggested that he and an associate could have cached the weapons, and he could later have sold the arms and dug them up. When the loss was discovered, it could have been attributed to a chance stumbling upon the cache by some unknown person.

25X1C

e. One Operating Division logistics officer suggested that, because of the close cooperation that develops between station logistics officers and the crews of Agency-operated aircraft, one should not rule out the possibility of collusion between them in the illegal transportation of firearms.

25X1C

f. Local military forces are another possible source of firearms that could be acquired without being taken up into accountable records. Our on-the-scene working arrangements with the military often are so close that an employee could request

S E C R E T

weapons for an unspecified operational purpose and probably could get them on nothing more than a hand receipt. The book-keeping on the transaction might never catch up with the employee. [REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED]

25X1C

2. The examples cited above are quite far-fetched, and they assume a lack of integrity on the part of an employee. While it is true that we have had an occasional thief in our midst, we operate on the premise that we hire employees who bring integrity to their jobs and that they do not lose it as a consequence of exposure to the intelligence business.

3. Several of the officers we interviewed, who are in positions to speak with authority on the subject, volunteered the comment that, while it would be impossible to write a regulation that would prevent a dishonest employee from engaging in an illegal firearms transaction, our existing regulations are such that he would almost surely be caught.

B57

S E C R E T

ARE THERE PAST OR PRESENT FIREARMS TRANSACTIONS THAT MAY EMBARRASS US
IN THE FUTURE?

1. Any individual weapon that is traceable to CIA is a potential source of future embarrassment, because we have almost no control over what happens to it after it leaves our hands. Rifles and carbines, which we requisition from the Military and supply in bulk to combat forces in Southeast Asia, are not traceable to CIA as a purchaser, because serial numbers are not recorded except at the time of issue to the user--if then. However, weapons that are procured covertly and all handguns and specially modified weapons, regardless of means of procurement, are recorded by serial number, and most of them are traceable to us. For example, a policeman noticed a handgun lying on the seat of a parked and unlocked car in New York City. The gun was traced to CIA. The owner of the car claimed that he had been on military duty in Vietnam and had acquired the gun in a trade with a Montagnard.

2. The potential for embarrassment over a single traceable weapon that goes astray is not high: usually the fact of its having gone astray becomes known when it is seized by U.S. police authorities. A tracing of its ownership history leads to CIA, and our records will reveal the disposition made of it by the Agency. An example occurred earlier this year. We received a letter in April from a

- 44 -

S E C R E T

B58

S E C R E T

Vice President of [redacted] alerting us to a probable visit from the FBI concerning [redacted] pistol [redacted] shipped to CIA in October 1965. Our records showed that the pistol had been shipped to [redacted] in January 1966. The Station reported in response to headquarters' query that it had received the pistol and recorded it in property accountability in April 1966. Issues were made to [redacted] [redacted] and the pistols were considered as operationally expended upon issuance and no serial numbers were recorded. The file does not reveal the reason for the FBI's interest in the pistol.

3. There are, however, some old large-volume firearms transactions, which might one day be the source of quantities of weapons traceable to CIA appearing on the illegal market. The so-called

[redacted] is one of these potential sources. Under the two-track approach, which CIA would have preferred

to have avoided, we mounted our own controlled Cuban operations and covertly supported "autonomous" operations over which we had little or no control. For example, we delivered 145 tons of ordnance materials to Manuel Artino at the end of 1963 for use in his autonomous operations against Cuba. Artino ostensibly bought these weapons from Interarmco who filled the order in Europe. Actually, they were shipped from the Midwest Depot, and Sam Cummings provided only

S E C R E T

25X1C

[REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED]

5. We asked almost everyone we interviewed if they had any recollection of CIA ever having been involved in a firearms transaction in any way resembling the Redick incident that led to this inquiry. We drew only one possibly affirmative reply, and even it is of doubtful validity. One officer thought he remembered hearing of something like this years ago—in which CIA was involved—but he could remember none of the specifics. He named other officers who

- 46 -

S E C R E T

B100

S E C R E T

might, from their duties at the time, have some recollection of it. None of them did.

6. An illegal firearms transaction involving Agency personnel is the sort of thing that might reasonably be expected to come to the attention of the Inspector General for possible investigation. We card the names of the principals in our investigations, but we do not index cases by subject matter. However, we do have personnel assigned with continuity on the staff extending back for seven or eight years. We can identify only two cases involving guns.

a. In January 1965, the A/DD/P forwarded to us for investigation a report that "the guns that disappeared several years ago were not stolen but were sold" by the chief of support of one of our field stations. Our investigation indicated that the station had reduced its weapons inventory, that the surplus weapons were disposed of in proper channels, and that the charge probably arose from irresponsible gossip.

b. The second case was investigated in January 1963. It concerned an American businessman with whom the Agency was associated in a proprietary interest (a gun manufacturing plant) in Mexico designed to provide nonofficial cover for Agency personnel. The businessman turned out to be a crook, and the dissolution of the proprietary relationship was accompanied by litigation between him and Agency representatives. He tried

25X1C

25X1C

25X1C

Boi

S E C R E T

to reopen his claims against the Agency in 1963. We reviewed the operational files and met with the businessman and told him that we saw no basis for reopening the case. He is now suing the Agency on a charge that the Agency was responsible for the breakup of his marriage.

25X1C

10. We have dissociated ourselves from Sam Cummings and the International Armament Corporation in our firearms procurements; however, we cannot be sure that all of the vestiges of the prior relationship are laid permanently to rest. In fact, experience to date indicates that we are likely to be plagued by them for years to come. The latest entry in the Interarmed file is dated 6 October 1969 and records the results of a meeting between representatives of the Agency and of the Internal Revenue Service concerning a past CIA/Interarmed arms deal.

- 48 -

S E C R E T

B62

DI 100-24

S E C R E T

25X1C

... was a member of the Haitian Coalition, which was covertly supported by CIA. The fact that he participated in the Haitian Revolution in a private capacity and that neither CIA nor the Haitian Coalition had anything to do with it in any form or degree of it does not greatly diminish the potential for embarrassment to us.

3. At Tab B we have a fairly detailed examination of two arms incidents in the New Orleans area, which District Attorney James Garrison tried to link to CIA and to the assassination of President Kennedy. CIA had nothing to do with either arms incident, and Garrison never, to our knowledge, came out with a flat statement saying that we did. What he did say was this:

"... a number of the men who killed the President were former employees of the CIA involved in its anti-Castro underground activities in and around New Orleans. The CIA knows their identity. So do I--and our investigation has established this without a shadow of a doubt. Let me stress one thing, however: We have no evidence that any official of the CIA was involved with the conspiracy that led to the President's death."

- 50 -

S E C R E T

B64

S E C R E T

HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE REGULATIONS?

1. Of course the regulations are important--indispensable, in fact--and it would be foolish of us to suggest otherwise. We ask the question as a means of focusing attention on a form of control that operates perhaps even more effectively than do the controls that are spelled out in the regulations. We are referring to something that might be called state of mind, or attitude, or atmosphere. We found a universal awareness that firearms, while treated as just another item of supply in the general supply regulations, are in reality a very special kind of property requiring special types of handling. It is widely believed that the upper echelons of the Agency would prefer to have no traffic at all with firearms and are likely to deal peremptorily with offenders who knowingly try to circumvent controls. This is not to say that people are running scared; it is just that they know what the general policy is, and they respect it.

2. What is perhaps most notable is the extent to which current attitudes with respect to firearms differ from attitudes that were prevalent in the Agency during its earlier years. Early in this paper we remarked that ordnance is big business in CIA--and this is so--but it is a quite different type of big business than it was in the nineteen-fifties. The massive weapons dealings with Interarms are a thing of the past. Today's outlook on weapons procurement in

25X1C

- 51 -

S E C R E T

B65

S E C R E T

the Office of Logistics is characterized by caution and conservatism. Within the Clandestine Service, there are variations in outlooks on firearms arising largely from differing conditions in the foreign field. Latin Americans and Africans, for example, like guns; and they are a useful commodity in fostering or reinforcing operational relationships. Not unexpectedly, officers of WH Division have a somewhat different attitude toward guns than do officers of, say, EUR Division. Yet another attitude prevails in FE Division as a consequence of its support of large-scale paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. We should add that FE Division makes a clear distinction between supply of weapons for combat and weapons for any other purpose. Even allowing for these variations in attitudes, we think it fair to say that the Clandestine Service, too, is living in a new era in which it is understood that firearms will play a small and closely monitored role.

- 52 -

S E C R E T

SECRET

B66

S E C R E T

TAB A

AGENCY REGULATORY ISSUANCES

25X1A

Headquarters Regulations

25X1A

HR 10-30

Authorization and Control of Firearms Issued for the Protection of Classified Documents and Sensitive Materials

HR 10-31

Authorization and Control of Firearms Issued for Training, Research, and Operational Purposes

HR 10-40

CIA Emergency Security Patrol

HR 45-10

Prohibition of Explosives, Incendiaries, Pyrotechnics, Chemical Ammunition, and Other Hazardous Ordnance Items in Agency Administration Buildings and Warehouses

HR 45-2

Procurement of Material and Nonpersonal Services

HR 45-5

Shipment of Government Property

HR 110-1a

Preparation and Transmission of Dispatches

25X1A

Headquarters Handbooks

25X1A

HHE 10-2

Security: Firearms

HHE 45-2

Headquarters Property Accounting Procedures, Type II Accountable Activities

HHE 110-1

Pouch Limitations

25X1A

Field Regulations

25X1A

FR 10-27

Control of Firearms

FR 45-10

Procurement

FR 45-11

Property Accountability Records

FR 45-1a

Disposition of Excess or Unserviceable Property

S E C R E T

B67

11 22 71

S E C R E T

25X1A

25X1A

Field Handbooks

FHB 7-1

Administrative Reporting for Small Stations

FHB 45-2

Field Property Accounting Procedures,
Type II Accountable Installations

25X1A

25X1A

Headquarters Notices

HN 10-65

Firearms

HN 60-15

Liaison with the Office of Munitions Control,
Department of State

25X1A

25X1A

Clandestine Services Instructions

CSI 10-15

Control of Firearms

CSI 50-22

Research and Development of Paramilitary
Material

CSI 110-2

Pouch Transmission Facilities and Limitations

CSI-P 110-2

Pouch Facilities and Limitations

25X1A

25X1A

Book Dispatches

BD 3732

Control of Firearms

BD 6622

Policy on Giving or Selling Firearms to
Foreigners

25X1A

25X1A

Miscellaneous Instructions and Directives

BD/P 8-3058

Firearms: Issuance to Foreigners as Gifts or
Accommodation Purchases

LI 1-5

Mission, Functions, and Delegations of Authority,
Supply Division, Office of Logistics

Memorandum from Director of Logistics to Chiefs, Procurement
Division and Supply Division, dated 16 August 1968, subject:
Procurement of Firearms

- 2 -

S E C R E T

B08

S E C R E T

TAB B

District Attorney James Garrison's investigation of the supposed New Orleans origin of a plot to assassinate President Kennedy tried to link CIA to two incidents in southern Louisiana involving caches of weapons and explosives. The first incident occurred in 1961 and concerned the theft of material from an explosives storage bunker at the Houma Air Force Base at Houma, Louisiana. The second incident was in July 1963 when the FBI seized a cache of explosives and other war-related materials near Lacombe, Louisiana.

Garrison may have gotten these two incidents confused in the early days of his investigation, thinking that the theft from the Houma bunker took place not long before the assassination of President Kennedy. It is also possible that he deliberately merged the two incidents to add sensation to his case. There may, in fact, be a link between the two incidents: the description of the materials seized by the FBI at Lacombe sounds suspiciously like those reportedly stolen from the Houma bunker.

In any event, a key element of Garrison's case was an allegation that one Julio BUZNEDO went to Dallas at the time of the assassination in a panel truck used in the commission of the burglary of the ammunition bunker at Houma, Louisiana. The truck allegedly contained three rifles and was parked behind the wall on the grassy knoll at Dealey Plaza.

S E C R E T

B69

S E C R E T

The following accounts of the Houma and Lacombe incidents are assembled from press and FBI reports. The FBI's sources are not often named, but they appear to have been dealing with the same people as was the press. Most of the sources are unreliable, and much of the available information is contradictory; thus, neither account is high on accuracy. Although details may be wrong in spots, the events did take place approximately as we describe them and serve to illustrate how readily an investigator could establish trails supposedly leading from these arms caches to CIA. None of the trails lead to persons who had a direct and then current affiliation with CIA, but there are so many trails that it is understandable how Garrison may have come to associate these caches with CIA.

The Houma Burglary

Gordon NOVEL fled from Louisiana to avoid (among other things) questioning by Garrison on NOVEL's role in a 1961 theft of explosives and related material stored by the Schlumberger Well Surveying Corporation in an ammunition bunker at the Houma Air Force Base near Houma, Louisiana.

According to NOVEL, the Schlumberger company had an arrangement with CIA wherein the company leased a bunker in which ammunition, bomb casings, and other material would be stored for CIA. The alleged theft by him and his associates was supposedly a war materials pickup made at the direction of his CIA contact. NOVEL first claimed

- 2 -

S E C R E T

B7D

S E C R E T

that the explosives were picked up and consolidated soon after the bunker incident and were taken to Cuba by boat for use in a diversionary operation in support of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

When it became known that the burglary occurred after the Bay of Pigs operation, reportedly on 1 August 1961, NOVEL changed his story. He claimed then that the Schlumberger interests became upset following the Bay of Pigs invasion and wanted out of their contract with CIA. Three months after the invasion, says NOVEL, arrangements were made (presumably by CIA) for the material stored in the bunker to be removed by NOVEL and his group. At the time the material was removed, one of the group also took some of Schlumberger's low-grade powder, fuses, and other material.

NOVEL has also told differing stories as to the disposition of the material stolen from the bunker. He first said that the material was to have been shipped out of the U.S. in Schlumberger boxes labeled "machinery." He later said that the boxes of ordnance were loaded on trucks, taken to New Orleans, and dropped in three spots: David FERRIE's home, Gordon NOVEL's office building, and Gay BANNISTER's office. NOVEL claimed that the munitions were later consolidated and taken by boat to Cuba for the diversionary operation. He later changed that story. Another source, Carlos QUIROGA, when questioned by Garrison, said that a Miami group picked up the cache and hauled it to Miami in a rented truck. QUIROGA said that he personally helped load the truck.

- 3 -

S E C R E T

B71

S E C R E T

NOVEL named Sergio ARCACHA Smith and David FERRIE as two of his associates in the burglary.

Trails to CIA from the Houma Bunker Theft

The Diversionary Operation: There was a diversionary operation planned, and the Cubans scheduled to participate in it were trained near New Orleans. This was the Nino Diaz group consisting of some 160-170 men who were to land about 30 miles east of Guantanamo 48 hours in advance of the Bay of Pigs landing. The Diaz group put to sea and actually reached its Cuban landing area on schedule. Poor Cuban leadership caused the operation to abort at the last moment. The training took place and the war materials for the operation were stored on a reactivated Navy installation known as the Belle Chasse Ammunition Depot about eight miles southeast of New Orleans. (Houma is about 45 miles southwest of New Orleans.) We find no record or recollection of arms for this diversionary operation being stored anywhere in southern Louisiana other than at Belle Chasse. Jake Esterline once described the Nino Diaz group to us as consisting of "a bunch of real thugs," many of whom eventually wound up in New Orleans as public charges or as threats to public order.

The Schlumberger Well Surveying Corporation: The Office of Logistics has had dealings in the past with Schlumberger-related firms, but avoided the Schlumberger firm itself because of its foreign ownership and questionable personalities in the firm.

- 4 -

S E C R E T

JUN 75

B72

S E C R E T

	None of these contacts in

any way related to the Houma bunker incident.

Julio BUZNEDO: Garrison reportedly believes that BUZNEDO was one of those present in David FERRIE's apartment when the assassination of President Kennedy was supposedly being plotted. Garrison also reportedly has a photograph showing BUZNEDO standing with FERRIE beside FERRIE's airplane. Garrison also alleged that BUZNEDO went to Dallas at the time of the assassination in a panel truck used in the burglary of the Houma ammunition bunker. The truck allegedly contained three rifles and was parked behind the wall on the grassy knoll at Dealey Plaza. Julio BUZNEDO may be identical with Julian BUZNEDO Castellanos, who arrived in the U.S. in late 1960 and enlisted in Brigade 2506. He served on the invasion craft BARBARA J, was captured, and was released in the prisoner exchange. JMWAVE requested a Provisional Operational Approval on 6 January 1961 for his use as a FM maritime trainee. The POA was granted on 16 January 1961 but was later cancelled. There is no record of BUZNEDO's being involved with the Agency, other than his participation in the Bay of Pigs operation.

Sergio ARCACHA Smith: ARCACHA was an associate of David FERRIE and was named by Gordon NOVEL as being a member of the group that

- 5 -

S E C R E T

B7/3

S E C R E T

burglarized the Houma ammunition bunker. Garrison brought Emilio SANTANA Galindo from Florida to New Orleans to identify ARCACHA as having been in New Orleans on a certain date. File traces reveal that ARCACHA became the FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO (FRD) delegate in New Orleans prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion and continued in that position until the FRD ceased to function. The FRD was the predecessor to the CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL and was organized and supported by the Agency. The organization was used as a front for recruitment of Brigade 2506 for the invasion. ARCACHA reported to the FRD headquarters in Miami through a post office box in Coral Gables and reportedly maintained extensive relations with the New Orleans FBI and Immigration offices. One of his regular FBI contacts was Guy Bannister, who was named by NOVEL as one of the persons to whom material from the Houma cache was delivered.

Emilio SANTANA Galindo: SANTANA, a convicted burglar, was brought to New Orleans from Miami by Garrison for questioning. Garrison reportedly hoped to use SANTANA as a means of linking ARCACHA to the assassination plot. An FBI report says that SANTANA was alleged to own a Manlicher-Carcano carbine like OSWALD's and to have been in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination on orders of the alleged conspirators (SHAW, OSWALD, FERRIE, and ARCACHA). SANTANA was recruited by the JMWAVE station in October 1962, and, after training, he participated in a single infiltration-exfiltration

- 6 -

S E C R E T

B114

S E C R E T

operation. He was terminated in October 1963. In 1964 he listed CIA as his employer when he applied for credit to buy an automobile. He knew eight CIA staff members by true names or aliases and 14 other agents.

Gordon D. NOVEL: NOVEL has both claimed and denied CIA affiliation. Garrison has claimed that NOVEL was a CIA agent and that one of his lawyers, Stephen PLOTKIN, was paid by CIA. NOVEL was polygraphed by Lloyd FURR, a private detective in McLean, Virginia. The reference to McLean caused newspapers to speculate that NOVEL had been polygraphed by CIA. NOVEL claimed that he and others robbed the Schlumberger bunker in Houma at CIA's instigation and that he ran the Evergreen Advertising Agency in New Orleans as a CIA front. He left a letter in his New Orleans apartment, subsequently delivered to Garrison, implying a tie between NOVEL and the CIA Double-Chek operation. NOVEL sent a telegram to the DCI on 28 May 1967 about the Garrison investigation. He telephoned [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 22 August 1967, saying that he would try to keep CIA from becoming involved in Garrison's investigation. All of NOVEL's claims about association with CIA are lies.

Carlos QUIROGA: QUIROGA was one of Garrison's prime sources of information on supposed assassination plotting in New Orleans. One interview was taped without QUIROGA knowing it, and Garrison subsequently released the transcript to the press. QUIROGA claimed to

- 7 -

S E C R E T

11 15

S E C R E T

have known of the burglarizing of the Houma bunker and to have helped load the material on a truck bound for Miami. QUIROGA is reported to have once been a member of the CIA-sponsored Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front. There is some evidence suggesting that he may actually have been a penetration of the Front on behalf of Cuban intelligence. While he was a student at Louisiana State University, QUIROGA was a candidate for the Agency's student recruitment program. (This program involved the recruitment of Cuban students in the U.S. who would return to Cuba as agents in place.) There is no indication, however, that QUIROGA was ever employed by the Agency in any capacity.

Carlos Jose BRINGUIER: BRINGUIER, evidently a confidant of Carlos QUIROGA, in July 1967 turned over to the FBI a copy of the transcript of QUIROGA's debriefing by Garrison. On 6 April 1967 BRINGUIER reported [] that he had been summoned to Garrison's office, was polygraphed, and was questioned concerning his CIA contacts. He was also questioned by Alberto FOWLER, a Cuban who is a Garrison investigator. According to a statement to the FBI by QUIROGA, FOWLER has claimed that Garrison would prove that BRINGUIER was aware of OSWALD's affiliation with CIA. According to the Warren Commission report, there was an altercation between OSWALD and BRINGUIER on 9 August 1963 and a radio debate between them on 21 August 1963. BRINGUIER is a former

- 8 -

S E C R E T

11 22 67

B76

S E C R E T

leader of the Student Revolutionary Directorate, an anti-Castro organization [REDACTED] BRINGUIER

was also an occasional contact, on his own initiative, of the [REDACTED]

STATOTHR

[REDACTED] Orleans DCS office.

STATOTHR

Miscellaneous Trails

David FERRIE: Garrison has repeatedly claimed that FERRIE was once employed by CIA. We have seen nothing that could conceivably link him with CIA--other than his association with persons having indirect ties to CIA through membership in CIA-supported anti-Castro organizations.

Clay SHAW: Surprisingly, Garrison has not, to our knowledge, publicly accused Clay SHAW of having ties to CIA. The DCS office in [REDACTED] New Orleans was in contact with SHAW some 30 times beginning in 1949 and ending in 1956. When General Cabell, then DDCI, addressed the Foreign Policy Association of New Orleans in May 1961, he reportedly was introduced by Clay SHAW.

STATOTHR

Lloyd FURR: FURR, the private detective who polygraphed Gordon NOVEL in McLean in 1957, can be linked with CIA but only in a most roundabout way. [REDACTED] had an unclassified contact with FURR in

25X1A

1962 to examine equipment offered for sale by FURR. In April 1963,

25X1A

[REDACTED] Robert E. Owen, then Chief, DDP/WE/3, directed a memorandum to the Chief, DDP/WE/6, in which he recorded a conversation he had on 27 April 1963 with Raymond CASSAGNOL, an anti-Duvalier exile from Haiti.

25X1A

- 9 -

S E C R E T

B77

S E C R E T

He relates in the memorandum that the conversation took place in the home of Richard L. EAST whom Owen met through a neighbor, Lloyd FURR.

[REDACTED]

25X1A

The Lacombe Munitions Cache

James Garrison said in his Playboy interview: "In the New Orleans area, where the conspiracy was hatched, the CIA was training a mixed bag of Minutemen, Cuban exiles, and other adventurers north of Lake Pontchartrain for a foray into Cuba and an assassination attempt on Fidel Castro. . . . when the CIA withdrew its support and they couldn't fight Castro, they picked their next victim--John F. Kennedy."

The New York Times on 1 August 1963 reported that the FBI had raided a house near Lacombe, Louisiana, on 31 July, and seized a cache consisting of 48 cases of 60 percent dynamite each weighing 50 pounds, twenty 100-pound bomb casings, paraphernalia for assembling fuses, 25 pieces of primacord, 24 blasting caps, and a 50-pound container of gasoline thickener. The following account of the composition and activities of this group in training near Lacombe is based in large part on statements of particularly unreliable witnesses, but it is close enough to the facts to fit our purposes.

In June 1962, Lawrence J. LABORDE, Gerald P. HEMMING, and Howard K. DAVIS visited Frank BARTES, a Cuban living in New Orleans, and

- 10 -

S E C R E T

B78

S E C R E T

reached an agreement with him for the training near New Orleans of anti-Castro Cubans as guerrilla fighters and demolition experts. LABORDE's son, Michael, identified his father's contact among Cubans as being Alberto FERNANDEZ of Key Biscayne, Florida, a member of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA. Rudolph R. DAVIS, another Cuban in New Orleans, arranged with Laureano BATISTA, in Miami, to send some 19 Cubans to New Orleans for training.

Rudolph R. DAVIS was reportedly the contact man between the Cubans at the camp and their American supporters, who were unnamed but were reportedly anti-Castro right-wingers. Victor PANIQUE was the Cuban in charge of the group, and Gerald HEMMING appears to have been in charge of training. According to Carlos QUIROGA, the men in the camp were disgruntled over the food and became demoralized when the FBI seized the munitions cache. QUIROGA claimed that he bought bus tickets for four of the men who had no money to return to Miami.

Carlos BRINGUIER, the former leader of the CIA-sponsored

25X1A

25X1A

Student Revolutionary Directorate, told a Warren Commission investigator in April 1964 that he had been visited on 2 August 1963 by two Cubans who claimed they had deserted from a training camp across Lake Pontchartrain out of fear that the training group had been penetrated by a Castro agent. BRINGUIER claimed that he had not known before then of the existence of the camp. BRINGUIER said that he collected funds from other Cubans in New Orleans to pay the fares of the two deserters back to Miami.

- 11 -

S E C R E T

209

S E C R E T

Trails to CIA from the Lacombe Munitions Cache and Training Camp

Alberto Federico FERNANDEZ Hechavarria: Albert FERNANDEZ was named by Michael LABORDE as being his father's contact among Cuban exiles. In a 1964 interview with the FBI, FERNANDEZ acknowledged that he knew of Rudolph DAVIS, the Lacombe group's contact with their American supporters. FERNANDEZ was a prominent member of the UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA [REDACTED]

Lawrence J. LABORDE: LABORDE was named as one of those contacting Frank BARTES in New Orleans to arrange for the training of the Cubans at Lacombe. Larry LABORDE was granted a provisional covert security approval for use by the JMWAVE station on 24 March 1961. A 31 March 1961 cable from Miami requested permission to increase his salary to \$700 per month, plus bonuses. JMWAVE requested on 20 April 1962 that the approval be cancelled on the grounds that LABORDE was a poor security risk. He served as chief engineer on FERNANDEZ' vessel, the TEJANA. LABORDE almost certainly was the source of the charges of CIA mismanagement of Cuban operations, which reached the White House and were the basis of the IG investigation in Florida in 1962. On 11 May 1967, LABORDE telephoned [REDACTED]

- 12 -

S E C R E T

JUN 1967

B2

S E C R E T

[] saying that he was a former CIA employee, that he feared that Garrison would subpoena him, that he was willing to leave the U.S. to avoid a subpoena, and that he wanted the office to tell him what to do. He was told that the [] office was in no position to advise him.

Victor Manuel PANEQUE y BATISTA: Victor PANEQUE was named by Rudolph DAVIS as one of the Cubans who arrived at the Lacombe training camp from Miami and was identified by Carlos QUIROGA as being the leader of the Cuban group. The Miami station, on 10 August 1964, requested a POA and Commo clearance on PANEQUE as soon as possible. The POA was granted on 13 November 1964. The station reported on 5 October 1965 that PANEQUE was to be terminated as of 31 October 1965, because there was no immediate operational use for him.

Gerald P. HEMMING: HEMMING was one of the men who approached Frank BARTES in New Orleans to propose the training activity at Lacombe, and there is some evidence that puts him in charge of training at the camp. HEMMING has denied sponsorship by any U.S. Government agency; however, there is information in the file indicating that he may have been in touch with the [] office at one time. A DDP/WH memorandum of February 1965 stated that the Clandestine Service had never had any operational relationship with HEMMING. A 1964 cable from a WH Division covert operations office [] reported that HEMMING's group had threatened to create a scene to embarrass CIA.

- 13 -

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Carlos CASTILLO Armas: The training site reportedly was located on or adjacent to a farm owned by Carlos CASTILLO Armas, who overthrew the Guatemalan regime in 1954. CIA's involvement in the Guatemalan operation and its support of CASTILLO have been the subject of widespread publicity.

Miscellaneous Trails

Carlos QUIROGA's ephemeral ties to CIA were discussed in the earlier section on the House cache.

Carlos BRINGUIER's similarly vague ties to CIA were also discussed in the earlier section.

- 14 -

S E C R E T

082